Low Ice, High Drama: Arctic politics in August

China and the U.S. trade barbs, S. Korea mulls Arctic shipping, NATO builds Nordic hubs

Few would point to the frigid reaches of the Arctic as an ideal destination for a summertime cruise. Polar scientists, however, would beg to differ. In July, August and September, the sea ice covering the Arctic Ocean recedes towards its annual low point, laying bare navigable sea lanes. The polar day is softer than in June, yet still spills abundant light over waters above the sixty-sixth parallel north. Oceanographic and climate processes in Arctic waters are usually most active at low summer ice, which allows for sampling to provide crucial data on how the region is responding to global warming. Late summer therefore provides a narrow window of near-optimal conditions for maritime science, drawing an annual armada of ice-capable vessels to the far north. But with the region mired in geopolitical tension, the eyes and ears of militaries are now more frequently cruising in their wake.

1. The U.S. and China trade barbs over icebreakers

In a show of naval strength, China for the first time dispatched five ice-capable polar vessels to the Arctic, ostensibly for scientific purposes. This marks a major expansion of the country’s Arctic presence compared to last year, when three Chinese icebreakers made the voyage through the Bering strait. Again, China’s flotilla was spearheaded by the Xue Long 2 (雪龙 2), the country’s homegrown polar research vessel (and, with its Polar Class 2 classification, one of its two ‘real’ icebreakers). The Xue Long 2 had just returned from a trip to Antarctica, as the flagship vessel of China’s 41st Antarctic Expedition.

As reported by veteran reporter Malte Humpert, the Xue Long 2 was joined in late July by the Shen Hai Yi Hao (深海一号), an “[…] ice-class research vessel specialised on Remotely Operated Vehicles and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles owned by China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association.” The China State Oceanic Administration’s Ji Di (极地), floated in Guangzhou last year, and Sun Yat-Sen University’s Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di (中山大学极地), reached the region in August. And the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Deep-Sea Science and Engineering’s Tan Suo San Hao (探索三号), which is the youngest among the five vessels and equipped with manned deep-sea submersibles, crossed the Bering strait in late July. China’s Ministry of Transport also began broadcasting daily Arctic ice charts and other sea ice monitoring products in mid-August, as was noted by Trym Eiterjord of the University of British Columbia.

Image: The Xue Long 2 as photographed in August by a USSCG long-range surveillance aircraft (Source: USCG Arctic District on Facebook)

China’s deployment of these vessels triggered long-standing anxieties in Canada and the United States. U.S. President Trump recently pledged around US$ 8 billion for expanding the American icebreaker fleet (for details, follow the excellent Peter Rybski on Sixty Degrees North). But China’s collection of icebreakers is already now larger than that fielded by the U.S. Coast Guard. It is also expanding at a much quicker pace. Combined with the more than forty icebreakers of its Russian partners, the Chinese navy may already be commanding greater strategic depth in some ice-covered waters than the U.S., even close to the latter’s northernmost shorelines.

Territorial defence is thus an immediate concern. But Washington would also want to cement its 2024 claim to the outlines of an Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic through a more robust naval presence in waters above the claimed area. Besides, U.S. policymakers are also gradually waking up to the diverse strategic links between the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific theatres. Further reinforcing the sense of alarm in Washington D.C. are ever more regular Sino-Russian joint coast guard exercises in the North Pacific, including one in late August near the Aleutian islands. And the ability by Chinese submersibles, including those fielded by the Tan Suo San Hao, to operate at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean (where the U.S. keeps a watchful eye on its critical underwater cables, nuclear attack submarines, and seabed mining interests) is also seen as a strategic liability.

Unlike in 2024, when the U.S. Coast Guard’s Arctic presence was hampered by technical faults and engine fires, the 2025 summer season saw a more assertive U.S. approach to the shadowing of Chinese vessels in waters near Alaska. In early August, the USCG’s Arctic District announced on Facebook that it had dispatched a C-130J Hercules long-range surveillance aircraft to monitor the Chinese flotilla. The USCG Cutter Waesche followed the Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di as it transited north in the Chukchi Sea after passing through the Bering Strait. And the USCG’s newly-commissioned icebreaker Storis was expected to immediately head north to contribute to the monitoring operations. U.S. efforts were also supported by the Canadian military.

In China’s state media and blogosphere, these deployments sparked a somewhat predictable buzz. The South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (南海战略态势感知计划), a Beijing-based (and government-aligned) think tank, published an analytical article complaining about U.S. “double standards” regarding the freedom of the seas. China is, of course, itself ironically no stranger to hypocrisy when it comes to maritime laws. Still, the think tank article makes a valid point. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 56 and 58, Chinese (and other) vessels are indeed entitled to operate in waters above other countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones, and even more so in waters above their Extended Continental Shelves (with a few exceptions). This point stands, even when legal uncertainties about the U.S.’ unilateral ECS claim are brushed aside (the U.S. Congress has never ratified UNCLOS, thus technically excluding the country from procedures for the delineation of ECS).

The USCG’s portrayal of Chinese research vessels entering waters above the U.S.’ claimed ECS as a reason for shadowing may thus be understandable from a strategic point of view. Its legal foundation, however, is somewhat shaky. In any case, the argument tragicomically echoes aspects of China’s own approach to militarising international waters in the South China Sea.

Other reaction pieces from China ranged from indignation to mockery, and are therefore harder to reasonably engage with. The Beijing Ribao (北京日报) quoted Zhuo Hua (卓华), an analyst at the School of International Relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, who suggested Canadian authorities had “stretched international law” by tracking the Xue Long 2. The Yangtze Wanbao (扬子晚报) accused the USCG of “premature complaining”, but also wrongly stated that “[…] the Arctic Ocean and its surrounding waters belong to no nation,” thus being open in theory to exploration by China (this would only be true for a chunk of unclaimed seabed in the middle of the Central Arctic Ocean sometimes nicknamed the “donut hole”). In the Global Times, a researcher from Shanghai’s Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies (上海环太国际战略研究中心) pointed to alleged instances of U.S. “militarisation” of the Arctic, accusing Washington of “hegemonic behaviour” in the region. The Renmin Ribao (人民日报), meanwhile, argued that the U.S. would not be able to achieve its stated objectives in constructing icebreakers. And a microblogger on the Guancha platforms jested that it might take the U.S. “two reincarnation cycles” for its shipyards to finish current government orders.

Meanwhile, Chinese civilian shipping continued to expand its footprint in the Arctic. Chinese importers reportedly resumed accepting LNG deliveries from Russia’s embattled Arctic LNG 2 site, and on the 15th of August, the Russian port of Arkhangelsk received its first container vessel from China in the summer season of 2025.

2. South Korea looks to Arctic shipping to reinvigorate southern ports

But China is not the only country looking to gain a stake in polar shipping, although the port of Shanghai has by now emerged as a quintessential regional hub for Arctic operations. South Korea, a country with long-standing interests in the Arctic, has recently rejoined the ranks of nations jockeying to become transit centres for the Northern Sea Route. In May, during a heated election campaign, the country’s future president Lee Jae-myung pledged to revive South Korea’s struggling southern port cities, including Busan, by turning them into gateways for Arctic shipping. In August, the new government announced the establishment of a “dedicated Arctic shipping mission and piloting operations to launch next year.”

Image: The port city of Busan in South Korea (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

The announcement does not only reflect South Korea’s confidence in the future viability of commercial shipping on the Northern Sea Route. It also, importantly, marks a shift in official relations between Seoul and Moscow. Before Russia’s full-scale onslaught on Ukraine, South Korea and Russia enjoyed tight bonds, especially in the Arctic. Korean shipyards built most of Russia’s Arctic LNG fleet, and Korean suppliers provided indispensable technological assistance to Russia’s key Zvezda yard. Seoul is among the world’s major importers of LNG, and in 2018 signed a Putin-brokered Memorandum of Understanding between Novatek and the Korean Gas Company on future LNG deliveries. South Korean logistics firms, including Hyundai Glovis, also ran some of the earliest commercial pilot sailings on the Northern Sea Route, including in 2013 and 2017.

These ties unravelled in 2022. Under the alliance-centric leadership of the Biden administration, Seoul aligned with Western sanctions on Russia. It further tightened its Russia sanctions in 2023 and 2024, hitting shipbuilding and LNG logistics. Relations deteriorated further when Russia revived its Cold War-era military ties with North Korea, drawing on Pyongyang’s ammunitions industries to supply its brutal land war in Ukraine.

Image: South Korea’s position in Arctic Destinational Shipping (Source: Map created by Mia Bennett and published her excellent 2014 Strategic Analysis paper on South Korea in the Arctic)

By comparison to his disgraced predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, Lee has taken a softer stance on Russia. On the campaign trail, Lee went on the record criticising Ukrainian government policies and opposing arms sales to Kyiv on economic grounds. Lee’s public revamping of interest in the Northern Sea Route, a Russian project, can be seen as a further softening of Seoul’s edge on Moscow. Domestic reasons, including concerns over the demographic decline of Busan, are the main drivers of this development. But Lee is also likely to have been riding the tailwinds of the new U.S. administration’s recent turncoating on Russia policy and trade attacks on its East Asian allies.

3. News from the European Arctic and NATO

In northern Europe, the integration of the Nordic countries’ militaries continues at pace. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland (all of which are members of NATO and the Arctic Council) share threat perceptions vis-a-vis Russia, as well as concerns over the wavering commitment to NATO by U.S. President Trump. Their militaries have pursued a path of integration since the founding of NORDEFCO in 2009, but efforts were expanded to include the strategic level, parts of command and control, and a collective strengthening of defence industries after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Nordics are a group of relatively small countries, but their combined economic weight matches that of Russia. It is hoped that integration will position the group as a sufficient deterring force, which Moscow will be loathe to attack even in the absence of a credible NATO Article 5 guarantee. The process is also hoped to provide the Nordics with a bolstered position in intra-alliance negotiations within NATO, as well as, tangentially, the EU.

Image: The Nordic flags (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

The Nordics’ new prominence in European defence diplomacy has attracted much attention from countries located elsewhere on the continent, some of which have referenced NORDEFCO as a model for European defence integration. As a corollary, the Nordics have been required to dial up strategic communications with the outside world, and manage more complex networks of alliances and partnerships. A focal point of discussions have been the Arctic policies of the five states.

In August, the Norwegian government established a full new land brigade in Finnmark, signalling a shift away from Cold War-era plans that would have foreseen surrendering the northern region to Russia and withdrawing behind fortified defence lines further to the south. Oslo also released a much-anticipated update of its official Arctic strategy. The document highlights the need for a “total defence concept” and improved Arctic cooperation with Sweden and Finland. It also parts with long-standing descriptions of Russia as a desirable Arctic partner, in favour of casting Moscow as the region’s most formidable security threat. The government also admits, however, that the implementation of its ambitious defence plans will require a demographic and economic revitalisation of the Norwegian north. Despite Oslo’s attempts to bring about improvements in the past, the region still suffers from relative peripherality, limited economic diversification, depopulation, and infrastructure gaps.

While it is hoped that Norway’s defence-minded refocussing on northern regions could provide developmental stimuli, critical voices were quick to highlight potential shortcomings. In the High North News, Arne O. Holm pointed out that the population of the region has continued to decline since the pandemic, in spite of government incentives. In a piece for the Arctic Institute, Alexandra Middleton of the University of Oulu poked holes into the assumption that Arctic militarisation will improve northern regions’ demographics and economic performance, pointing instead to the environmental degradation caused by military exercises.

Andreas Østhagen of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, on the other hand, welcomed the strategy and published a detailed discussion of the document’s implications, including a more restrictive approach to Arctic interactions with China. And Marc Lanteigne of the University of Tromsø pointed to Norway’s upcoming national elections, arguing that their results would be unlikely to bring about a renewed revision of a Norwegian Arctic strategy now driven primarily by structural factors.

In Denmark, meanwhile, rumours of covert U.S. intelligence activities in Greenland were finally confirmed by the government. On the 28th of August, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen summoned the American chargé d’affairs to present Copenhagen’s official complaint. Several U.S. individuals in Nuuk were accused of, among other activities, drawing up a list of “pro-American, pro-Trump” voices in Greenland. This comes before the official appointment of Peter Thiel protégé and PayPal co-founder Ken Howery to the ambassadorial post in Denmark. Howery has been linked to ultra-libertarian techie networks, including Praxis, a neofascist-leaning group aiming to build “deregulated libertarian network cites on a terraformed Greenland”, as well as cosmetics billionaire Ron Lauder, whose well-documented obsession with Greenland reportedly inspired Donald Trump to go after the territory.

In light of the threat posed to Greenland by the Trump administration, Denmark’s European allies have worked to increase their militaries’ visibility on the island. In August, both the German and French navies paid official visits to Nuuk. While the Bundeswehr’s readout on the event focused squarely on NATO obligations and the defence of supply lines and the GIUK gap, the French Ministry of Defence was more explicit in proclaiming Paris’ solidarity with Copenhagen and Nuuk against U.S. threats. The two visits have shed a light on France and Germany’s divergent approaches to Arctic security. While Berlin remains attached to collective defence via NATO, involving the United States at any cost, France sees the Arctic as a region of both collaboration and potential tensions with Washington.

Following the dismissal of Denmark’s spying allegations by Washington, accompanied by a suggestion for Danish officials to “calm down”, French Foreign Minister Barrot visited Nuuk on the 29th of August. France has also been keen to highlight its newly published Arctic Defence Strategy. The publication of the strategy squarely settled a long-lived intra-bureaucratic squabble over the priorities of French Arctic policy, which was waged between defence-oriented officials and the country’s environmentally-minded Minister for the Oceans and Polar Regions. Surprisingly, the French strategy was discussed at length in Chinese outlets, including the Renmin Ribao (人民日报). Chinese authors highlighted the strategy’s focus on legitimacy building for non-Arctic states as a prerequisite for regional defence activism.

In Finland, NATO launched its new Northern Land Command Headquarters on the 2nd of September, one of the first official structures of the alliance to appear on the territory of its second-newest member. NATO is increasing its institutional presence in northern Scandinavia, with a designated Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Norway’s Bodø, Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Finland’s Rovaniemi, and a planned Joint Logistics Support Group Headquarters (JLSG HQ) in Sweden’s Enköping. The Finnish Air Force also helpfully decided to finally remove a historical swastika from several of its flags, likely to avoid irritations that might arise when Finnish forces participate in joint operations with NATO allies from Germany, Poland or France.

In the maritime domain, NATO scientists launched a combined research mission from Tromsø in June. The researchers measured how the transformation of the Arctic affects sonar performance in the region. The data collected is expected to help adapt technology for submarines, non-crewed underwater vehicles and other capabilities operating in fast-changing Arctic conditions.

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