Russia and China are not aligned on Greenland

In the Arctic, the West is tilting at windmills

In a pivotal month for Arctic security, U.S. President Donald Trump revived his long-standing designs on the island of Greenland. On the heels of a military intervention in Venezuela, Trump again asserted a right for the United States to “take control” of Greenland, refused to rule out military force in pursuit of that goal, and threatened large-scale tariffs against European countries resisting his ambitions. NATO allies deployed troops to Greenland in an ill-fated attempt to demonstrate burden-sharing in “securing the Arctic.” Denmark and Greenland conducted shuttle diplomacy between Washington and European capitals in an attempt to defuse the situation. And while Trump eventually walked back the threat of a military takeover at the World Economic Forum in Davos, efforts by the working group established between Denmark, Greenland and the U.S. to hash out a “framework deal” on the island are likely to stall unless the U.S. president agrees to respect Greenland’s territorial integrity.

Notably, while the arguments put forth by the U.S. administration and the responses cobbled together by Europe were opposing in kind, they were apparently also anchored in what has become a shared — but somewhat shallow — threat perception. In essence, the United States and Europe agree that Russia and China are posing a joint security threat in the Arctic. While the U.S. and Europe clearly don’t see eye to eye on the modalities, they nevertheless seem to agree that Greenlandic security will have to be redefined to guard the island against that threat. And although it is unclear why such efforts would zone in on Greenland as opposed to the Bering Strait, concerns over Russia and China are now clearly producing remarkable outcomes. For instance, the EU is working out a spending boost for Arctic security, while the U.S. is reportedly pushing for the establishment of Cyprus-style security areas on Greenland to establish new military bases.

This raises a more fundamental question: how Arctic security is understood in Moscow and Beijing, and, specifically, how the Greenland crisis itself has been interpreted in each capital. While many Western analyses assume that both Russia and China would welcome the spectacle of NATO infighting, a close reading of Greenland-related coverage in their heavily censored media environments reveals important differences in interpretation.

1. Russia: Crimean analogies, legal fairytales and the demise of NATO

During the first Greenland crisis triggered by the current U.S. administration in 2025, Russian official and media messaging was incoherent. Authorities struggled to reconcile opportunistic appeals to UN Charter principles with the overtly imperialistic worldview embraced by Vladimir Putin after 2022. Officials alternated between pious declarations of Greenland’s right to self-determination and offhand comments about U.S. “historic interests” in the island.

By late January, these contradictions were consolidated into a more structured, if no less internally inconsistent, set of lines. An alleged media guidance document from the Presidential Administration reported by Meduza, though unverifiable, closely mapped onto subsequent coverage across Russia’s state-aligned outlets.

On one level, Russian officials denied any interest in Greenland, presenting Moscow as a detached observer concerned only with rising NATO activity. Putin declared the island “of no concern” to Russia, Foreign Minister Lavrov insisted Moscow had “no plans” of invading Greenland, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasised that Russia regarded Greenland as Danish territory, while the former Arctic Council diplomat and current ambassador to Norway, Nikolay Korchunov, lamented the “risk of heightened Arctic tensions” due to NATO actions.

Image: The propaganda show “Vesti nedeli” on 11 January 2026 (Source: Screenshot)

But on the other hand, Russian media were also instructed to portray the American plans as being analogous to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Trump supposedly was keen to “enter history like Putin” by expanding the U.S.’ national territory, behaviour that was to be framed as being "characteristic of great powers". Maksim Suchkov, director of MGIMO’s Institute of International Studies, told Kommersant’ that Trump was bent on an “annexation of the world’s largest island” for legacy reasons. And Sergey Lavrov managed to refer to the Greenland situation both as an example of “colonialism” while also likening it openly to Crimea.

But Russian commentators also leveraged Crimea for another argument: That Russia’s annexation of the peninsula was somehow not a land grab at all, but a voluntary and democratic realisation of the “right to self-determination” by the Crimean people. Ъ FM, for example, suggested that Crimea could be used as a blueprint for the U.S. to “help the local Greenlandic population realise their right to self-determination.” And on 29 January, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted an "official request" for the United Nations to recognise the "right to self-determination" of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and other occupied territories of Ukraine, citing the situation around Greenland as precedent. Although UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres rejected that request a day later, the Russian media — as well as the Crimean “parliament” and Dmitry Medvedev — reacted furiously, brandishing the alleged though near-universally disputed “legality” of Russia’s annexations of Ukrainian territories.

Most importantly, however, Russia portrayed the Greenland crisis as a welcome stick in the wheels of NATO and the wider “collective West”. Komsomol’skaya Pravda consulted experts on whether Greenland would become the “graveyard of NATO.” Maxim Dankin, the General Director of Russia’s Arctic Development Project Office, told the same paper that “the escalating tensions between the Americans and the EU play into our hands”. Kommersant’ ran a long explainer on historical wars between NATO members. The same paper also diagnosed a Western “leadership crisis”, arguing that the western alliance was about to fall apart. Foreign affairs doyen Fyodor Lukyanov argued that NATO would probably survive the crisis, but only because “no one takes Trump’s ultimatums seriously.” And several commentators suggested that the Greenland situation would further undermine the position of Ukraine, and expose the entirety of Europe to a sudden and sustained defence crisis.

2. China: U.S. “bullying”, EU strategic autonomy and international instability

China’s media landscape, by contrast, was focused more on questions of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention, as well as traditional accusations of “U.S. bullying”, imperialism, and indignation over the notion that China could pose a threat to any country deemed “foreign”. The People’s Daily (人民日报) ran a front page piece on how a Greenland annexation would definitely violate international law. A commentary in the Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚報) suggested that “Trump harbours a 19th century imperial ambition, hoping to occupy more territory”. And the China Economic Daily (经济日报) accused the United States of an “obsessive addiction to natural resources.”

Image: CCTV coverage of the Greenland crisis, 10 January 2026 (Source: CCTV)

More prominent, however, was a second narrative: The structural weakness of Europe, and China’s hopes for the EU to develop a more “strategically autonomous” stance in world politics. A column in the People’s Daily argued that “NATO is Europe’s Achilles’ heel, a fact the United States is well aware of.” Similarly, an article in the Yangcheng Evening News suggested that “Europe has really been pushed to the limit. It must be said that Trump has Europe firmly under his control. But Europe has already been quietly preparing for the aftermath.“ The same paper later argued that “history has shown that compromise cannot bring true security, but perhaps the potential humiliation from Greenland will prompt Europeans to reflect on this situation and ultimately take action to change.”

The Guangming Daily (光明日报) criticised that “the EU has followed the U.S. lead for many years. Its so-called strategic autonomy is easier said than done, often leaving it in a complex situation of internal conflict.” Ding Chun, director of the Center for European Studies at Fudan University, told the Jiefang Daily (解放日报) that “regardless of the outcome, this standoff has deepened the structural rift between the two sides, and Europe will further “de-risk” from the U.S.” And Cui Hongjian, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University, told CCTV that “Europe must seriously consider how to truly break free from its dependence on the U.S. and embark on a path of genuine strategic autonomy.”

A third, and somewhat unexpected, narrative strand examined the consequences for China of a potential end of NATO. Unlike in Russia, where commentators met that eventuality with glee, the Chinese media cautioned against its unpredictable ramifications. The China Daily (中国日报) argued that a fallout between the U.S. and Europe could “mirror the historical split of the Roman Empire into Eastern and Western halves” and cause “spillover effects that could directly and negatively impact the current international system.” In the China Economic Daily, an article suggested that “as a major builder of the post-World War II international order, this move by the U.S. has severely impacted the existing international order.” And Jian Junbo, director of the Center for China-EU Relations Studies at Fudan University cautioned in the Jiefang Daily that a “disintegration of NATO would trigger unforeseeable consequences.”

Lastly, Chinese commentators also focused on what U.S. actions would mean for access to the Arctic region. The Global Times echoed a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, who stated that “countries’ right and freedom to carry out activities in the Arctic in accordance with the law needs to be fully respected.” And for many outlets, the clearest benefit to China lay in the parade of European leaders that showed up in Beijing for state visits right after the crisis. In an optimistic editorial, the Beijing Daily noted that “China is becoming more popular as the U.S. government increasingly spreads fear through its threats to seize Greenland.”

3. The West should stop fighting windmills

Taken together, these narratives reveal a certain degree of overlap. In both Russia and China, the United States is portrayed as reckless, Europe as weak, and NATO as fragile. Both countries are looking to exploit the situation to their advantage. But while the similarities are real enough, and important to consider, the clear divergences between the Russian and Chinese perspectives cannot be ignored.

On the transatlantic alliance, for instance, Russia actively seeks fragmentation, viewing disunity as strategically advantageous, whereas China is weary of the systemic instability that could follow a serious rupture. Moscow has studiously avoided criticism of Washington in order to preserve tactical engagement with the Trump administration, while Beijing is openly confrontational, positioning itself as an alternative partner for disillusioned U.S. allies. Russia appears willing to rely on idiosyncratic interpretations of international law to justify territorial expansion, whereas China remains invested in strong non-interference norms, reflecting concerns over regime security and the legacies of colonial intervention.

Similarly, where Russia wants to see a weak and divided Europe, China places its hopes in European strategic autonomy as a vehicle through which the EU might align more closely with Chinese preferences. Russia remains protective of Arctic sovereignty arrangements and focused on preserving access to resources and military predominance. China, by contrast, promotes narratives of Arctic neutralisation and the treatment of the region as a de facto commons — an arrangement that would better accommodate Chinese interests.

NATO states may continue to pursue a “one size fits all” strategic narrative for the Arctic, one that glosses over the fact that the United States is primarily concerned with China while Europe remains focused on Russia, all in the name of alliance cohesion. But unless this narrative is grounded in a better appreciation of the differences between Russian and Chinese worldviews and Arctic strategies, the Greenland crisis will not remain an isolated episode of Western quixoticism. Instead, it will become a template for how the alliance exhausts real capabilities in pursuit of imagined threats — and, more dangerously, imagined convergence among adversaries whose interests, strategies, and worldviews remain distinct.

Image: Meng Jinghui's sinified stage drama version of "Don Quixote", shown in Beijing in 2010, also had the protagonist striking at invisible, hostile“windmills”

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