The Irony of Fate
Arctic security at the end of December
The inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th president of the United States may still be weeks away, but the country’s diplomatic reins are already being handed over. The Trump team is drawing up blueprints, appointing friends and flatterers to jobs abroad, and signalling disruptive intentions to allies and adversaries alike. Gone are the days when Truth Social, the president-elect’s microblogging platform, could be dismissed as an echo chamber for MAGA sycophants. Trump’s social media presence is reclaiming its former role as a bellwether for American foreign policy decisions. Around the world entire, officials are taking note - and scrambling to decipher the writing on the Twitter Wall.
Greenland and Trump in the Russian and Chinese media
On the 22nd of December, Trump took to Truth Social to announce his pick of Ken Howery as U.S. ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark. In 1999, Howery co-founded PayPal - alongside Elon Musk, and with funding from Peter Thiel. Thiel is a venture capitalist and avid Trump supporter, who acts as a bridge builder between Silicon Valley’s aspiring oligarchs and the American far right - including for Ken Howery. During Trump’s first term, Howery had already served as the U.S. ambassador to Sweden. In his Truth Social post, Trump praised the businessman’s commercial accolades. Bar that, the future president made no mention of Howery’s future responsibilities - U.S.-Denmark relations - in all but one aspect: His desire to - for purposes of “national security” - bring the island of Greenland under the “ownership and control” of the United States. Under Howery’s acceptance post on X, Musk commented “Congrats! Help America gain Greenland!” alongside a crying-with-laughter emoji.
Photo: Aerial view of the Pittufik Space Base on Greenland, the U.S.’ northernmost military outpost (Source: U.S. Government, published on Wikimedia Commons)
In 2019, Trump became the fourth president to propose a U.S. purchase of Greenland. In my November post for 66° North, I explained the reasons behind these attempts - and predicted that Trump might soon try again. As in 2019, the Prime Minister of Greenland, Mute Egede, quickly stated that the island was not for sale. A few hours after Trump’s post, the Danish defence minister, Troels Lund Poulsen, announced a defence package for Greenland worth $1.5 billion. The timing of the announcement, which had been planned beforehand, was referred to by Poulsen as an “irony of fate.” While Denmark’s ‘fate’ - the ramifications of Trump’s return to the presidency of its main security provider - needed not be laid out in black and white, the ‘irony’ should perhaps best be located in the undeniable effectiveness of Trump’s megaphone diplomacy.
It is not clear whether the president-elect’s plans for Greenland (and, apparently, Canada and the Panama Canal) should be viewed as irredentism - or a crude holiday prank played on a supposedly ungrateful NATO family. Either which way, Trump will likely be able to bring about his actual main goal - the increase of defence expenditures by America’s allies - through similar intimidation tactics alone. As Denmark’s recent spending hike illustrates, these tactics quickly give rise to anticipatory obedience, at no cost whatsoever to the American treasury.
In the case of Greenland, the U.S.’ now bipartisan desire to improve its military presence of the island is rooted in preoccupations over the Arctic policies of Russia and China. This fact - while still played down in most government statements in Nuuk and Copenhagen - has not been lost on Moscow or Beijing, and has been discussed at length in both countries’ propaganda-laden media spheres.
Photo: On a side note, “The Irony of Fate” (Ирония судьбы) is a classic Soviet screwball comedy traditionally aired on New Year’s Eve - to be watched! (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
In Russia, the TASS news agency ran an interview with Nikolay Korchunov - Russia’s ambassador to Norway, and long-time Senior Arctic Official. Korchunov declared that “Trump's proposal […] cannot but bring uncertainty and tension to this region. In recent years, we have seen an increase in the U.S. presence in Greenland, accompanied by a line on pushing China out of there.” Komsomol’skaya Pravda, on the other hand, suggested that Trump should not be taken “too seriously” and that his proposal should be seen as a “prelude to some more mundane agreements that he wants to squeeze out of these countries.”
Izvestiya published an analysis in which Greenland was depicted as a “bargaining chip” of little value to “Europe”. The paper suggested that Trump wanted to control Greenland in order to add military capabilities, which would then be directed against Russia or China. But the paper also mused that the “direct accession of the island to the United States as a state or territory” was “not the only option for the island to come under Washington's control” - and that Greenland “could be granted a treaty of free association [with the U.S.], which is already in force for Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau.”
Ekho Nedeli, and a host of other outlets, referred to a YouTube appearance by Richard Wolff, an economist at UMass Amherst, who proclaimed his theory that America’s own pretensions to the “territory of a European state” might make it more difficult for EU countries to continue to justify their support for Ukraine by reference to “an imaginary [territorial] threat from the Russian Federation.” Accordingly, Trump’s overtures to Greenland were portrayed by Elektorat.info as having handed “an unexpected advantage” to Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine.
Gazeta.ru quoted Konstantin Blokhin, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Center for Security Studies, who believes that talks between Washington, Nuuk and Copenhagen will not be “about a purchase, but about reaching an agreement with Denmark on favourable conditions for the deployment of American military infrastructure” on Greenland. These could then be used against Russia in a “21st century struggle over the Arctic.” Argumenty i fakty shared a post on X by Dmitry Medvedev, in which Russia’s former president suggested that Greenland could simply be “bought privately by Elon Musk.” Vesti, one of Russia’s TV propaganda behemoths, ran a long evening segment on Greenland, in which it echoed a quote in the New York Post by an unnamed source close to Trump. The source had disclosed the president-elect’s ostensible “belief that empires that don’t grow start to fail.”
In China’s comparatively more censored mediascape, reactions to Trump’s post were less colourful. In the Global Times, Cui Hongjian 崔洪建, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University, expressed his view that Denmark’s increase of defence expenditures on Greenland were still motivated primarily “by the Russia-Ukraine war.” The Renmin Ribao (人民日报) reminded its readers that, in 2019, Trump’s proposal to buy Greenland had been dismissed by Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen as “ridiculous'.“ The Jingji Ribao (经济日报), on the other hand, proposed that Trump’s proposal was sincere, and motivated by a U.S. interest in strategic waterways, resources, and military advantages.
Guangdong’s Nanfang Ribao (南方日报) called Trump’s advances “absurd” and pointed to them as “evidence” that Washington was stuck in “Cold War thinking”, with “hegemony” inscribed deep in the country’s “bone marrow.” A commentary in the Beijing Ribao (北京日报) suggested that Trump was serious about the proposed territorial expansion, which would turn the U.S. into the world’s largest country by territory, and that the West would be “fuming at the mouth” if China were to “disregard international law” in a similar manner. Referring to Denmark as the “United States’ little follower”, the paper concluded that “being an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but being an ally of the United States is deadly.”
Within China’s slightly more dynamic blogosphere, however, commentary on Greenland was slightly less monotonous - and often drew comparisons to Ukraine. For example, Dongyu Ji (东域记), a defence microblog run by a self-declared “former PLA Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Officer”, wrote: “In a sense, Trump and Putin are similar as heads of state, that is, they both have an irresistible greed for key foreign territories. Trump's greed comes from the family business spirit inherited from American real estate developers, while Putin's greed comes from the plundering tradition of the Russian Empire. […] No wonder Trump is always so fascinated by Putin. Maybe it’s because these two people like to seize other people’s land in their bones. Trump, at 78 years, is really too old. Even in this era, he is still obsessed with land.” A blogger from Hubei expressed surprise that “Trump’s appetite [was] even larger than Putin’s.” And a technology blogger from Chongqing suggested that Trump may even be “jealous” of Russia’s land grab in Ukraine, and thus incentivised to expand the American landmass by all means necessary.
Canada announces its new Arctic foreign policy
Russia and China also figured prominently in the Canadian government’s new Arctic foreign policy published on the 6th of December. The document is the newest such strategy paper released by a NATO state, and follows on those of the United States (Department of Defence), Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The Canadian policy update is different from its 2019 predecessor in that it is not a chapter in a policy framework, but a standalone strategy document. In line with recent trends, the policy emphasises security and military challenges. Notably, in military terms, it linked the Canadian Arctic to the Northern Pacific. This illustrates to what degree Western planners now view both the Pacific and European Arctic as potential theatres of confrontation. But while the Canadian document acknowledges tensions with Moscow and Beijing, it also expresses hope that the Arctic could be retained as a territory of general peace and stability.
Video: CTV News interview with Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Melanie Joly, on the new Arctic Foreign Policy, 8 December 2024
Ottawa has long been anxious about its assertion of control over its Arctic territories, and the new foreign policy makes sure to restate its uncompromising approach to Arctic sovereignty. However, the documents also attempts to balance these sovereignty claims made in the name of the Crown against a need to respect indigenous rights to self-governance. Inuit make up a significant proportion of the population in the Canadian Arctic, especially in Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, Yukon, and northern regions of provinces like Quebec and Labrador. Much of what Ottawa considers to be its sovereignty over Arctic territories is exercised in practice through historically complex-laden partnerships with Indigenous governments. From Ottawa’s point of view, upholding these rights in the Arctic territories is no question of political altruism, but political necessity. Without a permanent population, sovereignty claims can be difficult to assert. The Inuit population of the Canadian Arctic strengthens Canada's claim to northern lands, especially around contested areas like the Northwest Passage.
Photo: The Inuit and Arctic indigenous presence in the North American Arctic (Source: The Canada Encyclopedia)
But whereas Canada’s 2019 policy framework emphasised sovereignty before security, the new update reversed these priorities: To improve its military posture in the region, Canada wants to modernise its segments of the NORAD radar- and early warning chain, to expand the Canadian Armed Forces’ presence through joint exercises, new infrastructure, and improved mobility for Arctic operations, and to strengthen bonds with NATO allies. The latter goal is supposed to be realised not only through a bolstering of cooperation with the United States, but also the Nordic countries.
Funding for these endeavours is supposed to come from a CA$72 billion package announced for the defence of the Canadian Arctic in April. The earmarked funds are not guaranteed to come through, however, as was pointed out by Keith Halliday in a commentary for the Yukon News. And even with increased spending, many measures announced by Canada, such as the expansion to two of its polar icebreaking fleet, the regular deployment of F-35 jets in the north, or the promised NORAD upgrades, may not be realised until the 2030s - far too late, given the “urgent” defence challenges in the region, or Donald Trump’s notorious impatience with the low defence spending of the U.S.’ northern neighbour.
With Arctic military capabilities on the line in Canada as in other Western states, the diplomatic initiatives announced by the new Arctic foreign policy could yield a more impressive outcome by comparison. Most importantly, Canada plans to reactivate the post of its Arctic ambassador, which will be held by an indigenous person from the North. The country will open new consulates in Alaska and Greenland. While the Arctic Council remains paralysed, Ottawa wants to cooperate on Arctic issues in other fora, such as the UN, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, or the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. Canada will also increase its donations to the still-functional Arctic Council working groups, and continue negotiations with the United States on maritime boundaries in the Beaufort Sea.
While these initiatives will amplify Canada’s voice in the Arctic, they also sidestep the most thorny diplomatic problems Ottawa faces in the region. Under Trump, relations with the United States will inevitably become terse, especially on matters of security and defence in the north. The Arctic Council remains dysfunctional, and Canada and other Arctic states are lacking the means to salvage it. For the foreseeable future, the Canadian Arctic will remain insufficiently protected against attacks. And while the new foreign policy accommodates Washington’s focus on China as an Arctic security threat, the Canada-China Business Council only in November travelled to Beijing to discuss potential energy and other business deals - in conscious contravention of Ottawa’s security policies. This again laid bare the widening schism between the focus of Western metropolitan elites on security competition with China in the Arctic, and the perception of Chinese companies as valuable economic parters among many Western Arctic communities.
December in the Russian Arctic
Russia in 2024 again managed to increase the volume of cargo shipped across the Northern Sea Route. This occurred in spite of significant sanctions, such as the EU’s upcoming transshipment ban or its recent measures against the ‘Christophe de Margerie’ LNG Carrier. Western sanctions remain effective in curtailing the further expansion of production capacities of Russia’s Arctic energy projects, however: Due to a shortage of ice-capable oil tankers, and as a result of the sanctions, Rosneft recently had to delay the commissioning of its Vostok Oil site until 2026. Shortly before, Rosneft had concluded a deal to supply 500,000 barrels per day of crude to Reliance, an Indian private oil refiner, in the biggest ever energy deal between Russia and India.
As Western sanctions throw sand into the machinations of Russia’s energy projects, Moscow hopes that the pressure on its companies will ease after Donald Trump’s inauguration - and a possible “peace deal” for Ukraine. In this spirit, Novatek in December quietly dispatched a group of representatives to Washington DC. The visitors were met with little good will from the outgoing Biden administration - but possibly convened with other contacts of value. Meanwhile, Nikolay Korchunov, Russia’s ambassador to Norway, expressed his view that Trump’s return to office could facilitate a “return to cooperation” in the Arctic - presumably through a lifting of sanctions, and a subsequent increase in Russian cooperativity.
In the shipbuilding domain, Russia experienced a somewhat more successful month. On the 4th of December, the country’s newest nuclear icebreaker, the Yakutia, began sea trials - one month after the official release of the Chukotka. Russia’s nuclear icebreakers now number eight in total, and if production targets are met, its fleet will briefly peak at around ten vessels in the early 2030s. Russia is the only country to operate nuclear-powered icebreakers, and aims to complete construction of the world’s largest such vessel, the Rossiya, in 2030. Russia’s first domestically-built LNG carrier was also able to begin sea trials in December. Nevertheless, due to sanctions, the servicing and repair of ships along the Northern Sea Route is expected to run into problems in 2025.
Russia’s new Maritime Collegium under the leadership of Nikolay Patrushev convened on two occasions, in late November and December. The body is tasked with the deliberation of Arctic policy decisions. Hawkish as ever, Patrushev blamed Western states for the tensions in the region at the gathering’s press conference, and called on Russia to “develop [thoroughly unspecified, LW] breakthrough technologies”. At around the same time, Nikolay Korchunov complained about the installation of NATO’s Northlink satellite network, which was followed by an announcement that Russia would expand its own satellite services in the Arctic. The Russian army’s general chief of staff, Valery Gerasimov, promised a further increase of Russia’s Arctic military presence to “ensure dominance in the region” - without, however, providing any more specific information.
In the implementation of Russia’s development objectives for its Arctic territories, the country’s northern regions play an increasingly important role. The Russian media in December indulged in an amusing squabble between Aleksandr Tsybulsky and Andrei Chibis, the governors of the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk oblasts, over which city could claim the title as Russia’s “Arctic capital.” According to Dmitry Elovsky, a political scientist, Tsybulsky’s “breakthrough idea” of building deep-sea water ports for the Northern Sea Route in Arkhangelsk earned him Putin’s ear - and a slight edge in the leadership contest. In a very Russian assessment of power, the fact that Tsybulsky meets with Putin on an annual, as opposed to a less regular basis, was also taken by Elovsky as evidence for the governor’s growing political stature.
Photo: “Царь хороший, бояре тоже хорошие” - Tsybulsky and Putin in 2023 (Source: Kremlin.ru)
Finally, in hyperlocal news from the Russian Arctic, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug had to install AI-powered surveillance cameras near its new heated indoor bus stops, to prevent “vandals” from dismantling the stops for scrap metal and electronic components. During his dreadfully boring four-hour annual hotline conference with Russian citizens, Putin was made to promise that he would look into setting up cinemas in small Russian Arctic villages. And “Arctic Trophy”, a moderately successful food supplement business from Arkhangelsk, has struck gold: After the benefits of the protein tablets it produces for the nutrient-deprived inhabitants of Russia’s northernmost latitudes were discovered by exhausted Russian soldiers in Ukraine, the country’s military graced the company with a large batch order.
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