What's behind NATO's new Arctic mission?

'Arctic Sentry' needs broader commitments and a narrower geographical scope

After three intra-alliance spats over the future territorial status of Greenland — and a decade of infighting over what to make of Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic — the NATO states on 11 February announced plans for ‘Arctic Sentry’, a twelve-month, large-scale joint mission in the far north. NATO’s Allied Command Operations described ‘Arctic Sentry’ as a “multi-domain military activity that [will strengthen] NATO’s posture in the Arctic and High North.” Its objective will be to “provide NATO planners with full visibility of Allies’ national activities across the region”, allowing the alliance to “consolidate these actions into one coherent, overarching operational approach.”

1. What’s under the bonnet of ‘Arctic Sentry’?

Initially, ‘Arctic Sentry’ will “include exercises like Denmark’s ‘Arctic Endurance’ and Norway’s ‘Cold Response’”, and then integrate additional deployments. The mission will be led by NATO’s Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk, whose geographic area of responsibility was recently expanded to include the alliance members of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, effectively creating an integrated North Atlantic–Arctic command area. Command of JFC Norfolk itself was transferred from the U.S. to the United Kingdom earlier last month.

Image: Finnish marines disembark a Swedish Navy CB-90 fast assault boat near Tovik in Norway prior to Exercise Nordic Response in 2024 (Source: NATO)

On the strategic level, ‘Arctic Sentry’ marks a culmination of recent efforts by NATO to improve and integrate the alliance’s Arctic capabilities. The declared goal is to meet perceived security threats in the region from Russia, but increasingly also China.

On an operational level, the mission is supposed to streamline and integrate the different capabilities held by NATO members for Arctic-relevant operations in the air, land, sea and space domains, and to provide ongoing assessments of posture and capability gaps. While NATO activities in the Arctic have mushroomed in recent years, operational cacophony, discrepancies in equipment and ability, and a lack of political cooperation have often complicated allied joint operations.

Arctic-relevant acquisitions by alliance members — intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, space-based capabilities, maritime assets like icebreakers, and vehicles, weapons and other equipment better suited for the extreme cold — will likely be coordinated. ‘Arctic Sentry’ will also build on recently established NATO infrastructures in the region, including the Combined Air Operations Centre opened in Norway’s Bodø in 2025, and the Forward Land Forces based in the Finnish town of Rovaniemi.

2. Why is the mission being launched now?

The political momentum behind ‘Arctic Sentry’ initially grew out of a German proposal from early January. In response to U.S. President Trump’s comments that U.S. “control” of Greenland would be necessary due to “neglect” of the island’s defence by Denmark, Berlin proposed to create an Arctic joint mission under U.S. leadership, modelled on NATO’s ‘Baltic Sentry’. Whereas Belgium, the U.K., and other European states quickly seconded Berlin’s proposal, NATO chiefs initially met it with caution. After transatlantic tensions around Greenland smoothed out following Trump’s meeting with NATO’s Secretary-General Rutte in Davos, however, the White House eventually greenlit plans for a joint mission, allowing planners to move ahead.

International media coverage of NATO’s announcement has been enormous. However, three questions have received insufficient attention in the discussion. First, what Arctic capabilities will alliance members actually be able to pledge to the mission? Second, what will be the mission’s actual geographical focus? And third, is it likely to further heighten military tensions across the wider Arctic?

3. What Arctic capabilities does NATO possess?

The military problem set faced by NATO in the Arctic is inherently multi-domain. Of crucial importance are the protection of sea lines of communication, persistent surveillance of vast and sparsely populated territories, maritime access, the protection of underwater infrastructure, and capabilities to rapidly reinforce the alliance’s northern flank in a crisis or war. Unlike in other geographical areas, expeditionary capabilities and air power are often more important in the Arctic than permanently stationed assets. Environmental conditions are prohibitive, and operational skills must be acquired through consistent training and exposure.

Narrow Arctic capabilities are concentrated in the hands of a few regional alliance members, while other allies contribute to northern operations through deployable air power, expeditionary maritime forces, or cold-weather-trained troops that can be transferred to the region. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States possess assets such as dedicated Arctic presence forces, sub-Arctic brigades or regiments, ice-capable coast guard vessels, or sea and air bases located in Arctic territories.

In the land domain, Norway in many ways still sets operational benchmarks for NATO. The Norwegian Army’s Brigade Nord train year-round in the country’s Arctic north. The United States reactivated the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as an Arctic-focused formation in 2022 and maintains a dedicated Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Wainwright. Finland’s Jaeger Brigade and large reserve force are trained for cold-weather operations and can deploy quickly and at scale.

While numerically smaller, Sweden’s Norrbotten Regiment is specialised in winter warfare and operates in the country’s Arctic region, and the Canadian Rangers are reservists deeply embedded in northern communities. The Danish military has a permanent presence on Greenland, including the now infamous Sirius Dog Sled Patrol. Other allies may also contribute troops to operations in the far north, including France’s 27e Brigade d’Infanterie de Montagne, Germany’s Gebirgsjäger, and the U.K.’s Royal Marines Commando Force, all of which have participated in cold-weather exercises in Scandinavia in recent years.

Image: A U.S. Marine Lance Corporal participates in cold water immersion training near Bardufoss in Norway in 2018 (Source: NATO)

In the maritime domain, icebreakers, ice-reinforced vessels and submarines are key. The U.S. Coast Guard operates one heavy and one medium icebreaker, and is currently constructing a new class of Polar Security Cutters. The Canadian coast guard is expanding its fleet of medium and heavy icebreakers. Denmark possesses a number of ice-strengthened Arctic patrol vessels. Norway operates a coast guard vessel with genuine icebreaking capability. Germany and Sweden possess large research icebreakers, Finland is a recognised icebreaking powerhouse, and Poland operates smaller icebreakers in the Baltic. The U.S., France and the U.K. field nuclear submarines for under-ice operations, while Norway, Sweden, Germany and others hold smaller submarines for potential operations in Arctic-adjacent seas.

Finally, distances in the Arctic, the sparseness of local infrastructure, and surveillance needs render the aerospace domain decisive. NATO members fall into two Arctic air power categories, with structural power being provided chiefly by the U.S., Norway, Finland, Sweden and Canada, and reinforcement power being provided by France, the U.K. and Germany. Norway, for instance, holds F-35A fighters based at bases in Ørland and Evenes, and operates several P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Finland is in possession of F/A-18 Hornets, and transitioning to F-35A aircraft, with an air doctrine structured around resilience to assumed vulnerabilities and compromised basing infrastructure. Sweden’s JAS 39 Gripen is built for dispersed operations, and well-suited to Arctic conditions. The U.S. has enormous air capabilities concentrated in Alaska, which include F-22 Raptors at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, F-35s and F-16s at Eielson Air Force Base, strategic bombers on rotation, and an extensive early warning network. Integrated into North American homeland defences are Canada’s CF-18 Hornets, which could soon be replaced by F-35. The U.K. has deployed Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Iceland and Norway, and potentially holds expeditionary capabilities in the form of F-35B. France has deployed Rafales to Nordic exercises, and Germany has sent several of its Eurofighters to Arctic exercises.

Air field are distributed around the Arctic allied states, including in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada and Alaska. The U.S. and its allies in Scandinavia have signed a range of new access agreements for Nordic bases in recent years. A key role is played in this domain by Iceland, an alliance member without its own military, whose Keflavik Air Base is used by U.S. and NATO aircraft, and which plays a central role in GIUK gap monitoring. Space capabilities, meanwhile, are predominantly provided by the U.S., with Norway making significant strides to play a more important role.

3. Which of these capabilities have been pledged for ‘Arctic Sentry’?

Actual commitments of allied capabilities to ‘Arctic Sentry’ have so far been limited, however, as the final shape and form of the mission remains to be hammered out: In one of the first mission-specific announcements, the Danish Ministry of Defence pledged an unspecified number of F‑35 jets as its first contribution, and explicitly folded its already-planned Arctic activities into the ‘Arctic Sentry’ umbrella. Sweden deployed JAS 39 Gripen fighters to the area around Iceland and Greenland. Finland reframed its participation in Norway’s Cold Response 26 exercise as a contribution to ‘Arctic Sentry’, as did Norway. Multiple official U.S. Marine Corps releases detailed U.S. logistics and deployment-readiness capabilities for ‘Cold Response 26’, which is now framed as part of ‘Arctic Sentry’. Canada’s Department of National Defence described an expanded 2026 CAF Arctic operations programme and stated that Canada welcomes ‘Arctic Sentry’, but without specifying commitments.

Of the non-Arctic allied states, the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence announced a plan to double British troops in Norway from 1,000 to 2,000, in addition to deploying 1,500 Royal Marines for ‘Cold Response 26’, a carrier strike group deployment led by the HMS Prince of Wales in 2026, as well as Royal Navy warships, F‑35 jets, and helicopters, all under ‘Arctic Sentry’. Germany announced deployments of forces “from all branches of the service” in the coming months, and dispatched an A400M tanker aircraft and four Eurofighter jets to Iceland. And Emmanuel Macron pledged as of yet unspecified French contributions to the mission during a press conference with Finnish president Stubb. These announcements illustrate that allied governments are increasingly linking existing deployments and exercises to the emerging mission framework. Yet they also highlight how much of the initiative remains operationally undefined.

4. What’s still unclear about ‘Arctic Sentry’ and NATO’s Arctic posture?

NATO’s Arctic capabilities are therefore considerable, yet it remains unclear whether, and to what extent, they will require further enhancement. It is also uncertain which of these capabilities will be drawn upon under the umbrella of ‘Arctic Sentry’, where they will be deployed, and how this may affect the alliance’s overall Arctic posture.

For one thing, NATO will need to decide to what extent it wants to match the Arctic capabilities of Russia. While NATO retains a global conventional advantage, and holds an edge in air power, expeditionary capabilities, reconnaissance and anti-submarine capabilities, the military balance between the alliance and Russia in the Arctic is not symmetrical. Russia has rebuilt and expanded Cold War–era airfields, ports, radar stations, and military facilities along its Arctic coastline, which gives it a clear comparative lead in forward infrastructure. The Northern Fleet remains the backbone of Russia’s Arctic power projection, and includes dozens of surface warships, patrol vessels, and submarines. Russia also fields far more heavy icebreakers than any other Arctic state, many of which are nuclear-powered and capable of sustained operations in thick ice, a crucial element in Arctic logistics. And while many of Russia’s Arctic units been depleted or redeployed due to the Ukraine war, its local formations are sizeable and trained and equipped for harsh Arctic conditions. To catch up, NATO states would need to commit to sustained, decades-long investment programmes.

However, matching Russian capabilities across the board may not be necessary given the likely threat scenarios. Between 2015 and 2022, Russia still conducted naval and air exercises, including live-fire drills, on NATO’s northern flank, ostensibly for purposes of political signalling. Since the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, the pattern of Russian Arctic military activity has changed significantly. Most Russian exercises in the high north now take place in the Barents Sea, closer to Russian coastlines rather than Norway. According to a 2024 study by Kristian Åtland, Thomas Nilsen, and Torbjørn Pedersen, the primary purpose of Russia’s current military activities in the Arctic now appears to be the more limited objective of reinforcing the Northern Fleet’s “bastion” defence of ballistic missile submarines on the Kola peninsula. Drawing on open-source data, Tormod Heier similarly concluded in a 2025 study that there was “no military antagonism nor provocative exercises between U.S. and Russian forces in the Arctic [after] 2022,” suggesting a recognition of overstretch and subsequent retraction on the Russian side. Paradoxically, the war in Ukraine may thus have contributed to a temporary stabilisation of Arctic military confrontation. And while Russia’s Arctic forces will certainly recuperate, its overall posture in the region is likely to remain defensive. NATO’s objective should therefore be limited deterrence focused on monitoring and denial rather than capability outmatching.

Image: The Brest, a small anti-submarine ship of Russia’s Northern Fleet, during a live-firing exercise in 2022 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

At the same time, Russia remains committed to preserving the Arctic as a zone of economic development, particularly its hydrocarbon projects on the Taymyr Peninsula and the infrastructure underpinning the Northern Sea Route. Even after a hypothetical end to the war in Ukraine and a subsequent Russian military recovery in the north, escalating military tensions, especially in remote Arctic areas, would place these investments at risk and would therefore remain undesirable from Moscow’s perspective.

A partial exception is northern Scandinavia, where strategic planning continues to echo Cold War logics. Given the central role of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, much of which is based on the Kola peninsula near the Norwegian border, any large-scale armed conflict with NATO could trigger an invasion of northern Norway as well as adjacent areas of Finland and Sweden. In such a scenario, Russian military planning might prioritise securing freedom of action around the Northern Fleet’s “bastion” and constraining NATO access to surrounding regions. Only last month, Norway’s chief of defence, Eirik Kristoffersen, told the Guardian that such a scenario remains likely.

However, preparations for this type of conflict in northern Scandinavia predate any discussion of ‘Arctic Sentry.’ Dedicated capabilities have long been developed for this purpose. The expansion of Norway’s military presence in the north, NATO’s regional joint exercises, the establishment of new alliance infrastructure in Scandinavia, operations in the GIUK gap to protect sea lines of communication, and the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance are all oriented toward this contingency.

What, therefore, is the added value and military rationale of ‘Arctic Sentry’? Two possible explanations stand out. First, the United States has demanded greater engagement from NATO partners in the defence of its own northern flank in a potential confrontation with China. Sino-Russian joint air and naval exercises in the northern Pacific have become more frequent. Although most European Arctic planners remain primarily focused on Russia, China now figures more prominently in U.S. Arctic planning. These differing threat perceptions may require a broader geographical focus for the alliance, including the North American Arctic and specifically Alaska and the Bering Strait. ‘Arctic Sentry’ could therefore include a significant North American component — which would, however, need to focus on the Pacific side of the region, and thus be far removed from NATO’s historical area of operations.

Second, and closely linked to the first point, ‘Arctic Sentry’ would likely not have been proposed without renewed U.S. efforts to gain control of Greenland. U.S. officials have criticised what they describe as insufficient attention to Greenland’s security by Denmark and its European partners. ‘Arctic Endurance,’ one of the two current pillar exercises under ‘Arctic Sentry,’ was arguably conceived by Denmark as both a deterrent and a reassurance measure in response to U.S. plans for Greenland. Yet while Russia and China feature prominently in American arguments about Greenland’s strategic importance, neither Washington nor European capitals have clearly defined the actual threat scenarios that would necessitate a specific allied response. Possible contingencies range from hybrid activities and maritime confrontations in the GIUK gap to amphibious landings on Greenland or the reinforcement of missile defence around Pituffik Space Base. Each of these scenarios would require distinct military responses.

This ambiguity also helps explain the limited detail provided by NATO capitals regarding the capabilities to be deployed and their geographic distribution. Planning for conflict in northern Scandinavia will largely proceed along previously established lines. A sustained allied presence in Alaska remains unlikely given its distance from Europe, while threat scenarios around Greenland remain too indeterminate to justify concrete military measures beyond symbolic signalling. At the same time, these considerations form a central part of the political rationale underpinning the creation of ‘Arctic Sentry.’

The mission’s primary drivers therefore appear less military-strategic than political. This, however, also constitutes its unspoken vulnerability: If ‘Arctic Sentry’ functions at least in part as an instrument of alliance management designed to accommodate the preferences of U.S. President Trump over Greenland, then its coherence may also depend on the durability of those very same preferences. A renewed shift in the White House’s position on Greenland remains plausible and could rapidly undermine the political and strategic foundations of ‘Arctic Sentry’.

5. Will ‘Arctic Sentry’ heighten military tensions in the Arctic?

Regardless of ‘Arctic Sentry’’s rationale, however, it seems clear that the mission will lead to a further increase in NATO’s Arctic military deployments. In expert circles, this has led to debates over whether the mission is likely to further increase tensions in the region, and contribute to its wider militarisation. In a piece for Responsible Statecraft, Pavel Devyatkin argued that NATO’s launch of ‘Arctic Sentry’ has not been matched by equivalent efforts to manage risks of miscalculation or de-escalation, such as confidence- and security-building measures. Devyatkin pointed out that this could trigger an action-reaction cycle with Russia, where each side frames its activities as defensive but contributes to mutual threat perceptions, increasing the risk of accidental escalation.

Gabriella Gricius, by contrast, argued in an essay for the Center for Strategic and International Studies that the growing frequency of military exercises in the European Arctic does not necessarily indicate unchecked militarisation or an imminent escalation of conflict. Rather, it reflects the emergence of a new equilibrium in which states use exercises and visible presence to signal deterrence, credibility, and predictability. NATO activities, alongside Russia’s own drills, contribute to deterrence by denial and strengthen interoperability among allied forces, while hybrid threats remain more pressing than scenarios of conventional war. In a comment for 66° North, Gricius added: “I do not expect ‘Arctic Sentry’ to heighten military tensions. I see it as a strategy for the Allies to develop more presence and predictability in the region.”

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